



---

COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF  
MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM

---

December 2, 2008

The Honorable George W. Bush  
President of the United States  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), we hereby submit the report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.

The mandate given to this Commission by Congress was far-reaching. We were given a charter to assess, within 180 days, any and all of the nation's activities, initiatives, and programs to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism. We were also asked to provide concrete recommendations—a road map, if you will—to address these threats.

In response, we brought together a staff of more than two dozen professionals and subject matter experts from across the national security, intelligence, and law enforcement communities. We interviewed more than 250 government officials and nongovernmental experts. We held eight major commission meetings and one public hearing.

Our research encompassed travel from the Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico to London to Vienna. We traveled to Moscow to assess U.S. nuclear cooperation initiatives with Russia. We were en route to Pakistan, a country of particular interest to this Commission and to the United States, only to hear that the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad had occurred. We had been hours from staying in that very hotel.


Ultimately, we opted to center the Commission findings on several areas where the risks to the United States are increasing: the crossroads

of terrorism and proliferation in the poorly governed parts of Pakistan, the prevention of biological and nuclear terrorism, and the potential erosion of international nuclear security, treaties, and norms as we enter a nuclear energy renaissance.

The intent of this report is neither to frighten nor to reassure the American people about the current state of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It is to underscore that the U.S. government has yet to fully adapt to these circumstances, and to convey the sobering reality that the risks are growing faster than our multilayered defenses. Our margin of safety is shrinking, not growing.

We thank you for the honor of allowing us to serve our country in this task. Our Commission and staff stand ready to help you in any way possible to explore and weigh the findings and recommendations contained in this report.

Respectfully submitted,



Senator Bob Graham  
Chairman



Senator Jim Talent  
Vice-Chairman



Dr. Graham T. Allison




Ms. Robin Cleveland



Mr. Stephen G. Rademaker



The Honorable Timothy J. Roemer



Ambassador Wendy R. Sherman



Mr. Henry D. Sokolski



Mr. Richard Verma



---

COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF  
MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM

---

December 2, 2008

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi United States House of Representatives 235 Cannon House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515	The Honorable John A. Boehner United States House of Representatives 1011 Longworth House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515
--	---

The Honorable Harry Reid United States Senate 528 Hart Senate Office Building Washington, D.C. 20510	The Honorable Mitch McConnell United States Senate 361-A Russell Senate Office Building Washington, D.C. 20510
---	---

Dear Speaker Pelosi, Majority Leader Reid, Minority Leader Boehner, and  
Minority Leader McConnell:

In accordance with the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), we hereby submit the report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.

The mandate given to this Commission by Congress was far-reaching. We were given a charter to assess, within 180 days, any and all of the nation's activities, initiatives, and programs to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism. We were also asked to provide concrete recommendations—a road map, if you will—to address these threats.

In response, we brought together a staff of more than two dozen professionals and subject matter experts from across the national security, intelligence, and law enforcement communities. We interviewed more than 250 government officials and nongovernmental experts. We held eight major commission meetings and one public hearing.

Our research encompassed travel from the Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico to London to Vienna. We traveled to Moscow to assess U.S. nuclear cooperation initiatives with Russia. We were en route to Pakistan, a country of particular interest to this Commission and to the United States,


only to hear that the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad had occurred. We had been hours from staying in that very hotel.

Ultimately, we opted to center the Commission findings on several areas where the risks to the United States are increasing: the crossroads of terrorism and proliferation in the poorly governed parts of Pakistan, the prevention of biological and nuclear terrorism, and the potential erosion of international nuclear security, treaties, and norms as we enter a nuclear energy renaissance.

The intent of this report is neither to frighten nor to reassure the American people about the current state of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It is to underscore that the U.S. government has yet to fully adapt to these circumstances, and to convey the sobering reality that the risks are growing faster than our multilayered defenses. Our margin of safety is shrinking, not growing.

We thank you for the honor of allowing us to serve our country in this task. Our Commission and staff stand ready to help you in any way possible to explore and weigh the findings and recommendations contained in this report.

Respectfully submitted,



Senator Bob Graham  
Chairman




Senator Jim Talent  
Vice-Chairman



Dr. Graham T. Allison




Ms. Robin Cleveland



Mr. Stephen G. Rademaker



The Honorable Timothy J. Roemer



Ambassador Wendy R. Sherman



Mr. Henry D. Sokolski



Mr. Richard Verma



## ***Preface***

During the course of our fieldwork for this report, the members of the Commission had a near miss—and it served as a reminder of the urgency of our mission and message.

Asked by Congress to recommend ways of preventing weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism, we were on our way to a place where these two concerns intersect—Pakistan. On September 20, 2008, we were in Kuwait City awaiting our connecting flight to Islamabad, where we would be staying at the Marriott Hotel. Suddenly our cell phones began buzzing with breaking news: the Islamabad Marriott had just been devastated by a bomb.

Minutes later, every television set in the airport was showing live footage of our destination. The Marriott was ablaze, a line of fire running its length. The hotel front was a mass of twisted iron and broken concrete. What once had been the lobby was now a huge black crater. More than fifty people lost their lives that day at the Islamabad Marriott, a gathering place for prominent visitors and influential locals. Within hours, the attack came to be known as Pakistan's 9/11—a frightening reminder that we live in an age of global terrorism.

The world is also imperiled by a new era of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our Commission was charged with recommending ways of halting and reversing this proliferation. We focused on two categories of WMD—nuclear and biological weapons—because they pose the greatest peril.

The proliferation of these weapons increases the risk that they may be used in a terrorist attack in two ways. First, it increases the number of states that will be in a position either to use the weapons themselves or to transfer materials and know-how to those who might use WMD against us. The more proliferation that occurs, the greater the risk of

## *Preface*

additional proliferation, as nations that have to this point declined to acquire nuclear weapons will believe it necessary to counter their neighbors who have developed those capabilities. Second, it increases the prospect that these weapons will be poorly secured and thus may be stolen by terrorists or by others who intend to sell them to those who would do us harm.

Terrorists are determined to attack us again—with weapons of mass destruction if they can. Osama bin Laden has said that obtaining these weapons is a “religious duty” and is reported to have sought to perpetrate another “Hiroshima.”

Our Commission is a legacy of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission). The reports produced by these commissions explained to the American people how and why the U.S. government failed to discover that terrorists, operating from Afghanistan, were infiltrating the United States in order to use a most unconventional resource—commercial airplanes—as weapons that would kill thousands of people. We have a far different mandate: to examine the threats posed to the United States by weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism in a world that has been changed forever by the forces of globalization.

The United States still wields enormous power of the traditional kind, but traditional power is less effective than it used to be. In today’s world, individuals anywhere on the planet connect instantly with one another and with information. Money is moved, transactions are made, information is shared, instructions are issued, and attacks are unleashed with a keystroke. Weapons of tremendous destructive capability can be developed or acquired by those without access to an industrial base or even an economic base of any kind, and those weapons can be used to kill thousands of people and disrupt vital financial, communications, and transportation systems, which are easy to attack and hard to defend. All these factors have made nation-states less powerful and more vulnerable relative to the terrorists, who have no national base to defend and who therefore cannot be deterred through traditional means.

One of the purposes of this report is to set forth honestly and directly, for the consideration of the American people, the threat our country faces if terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction. We also

## *Preface*

present recommendations of actions that the United States can undertake—unilaterally and in concert with the international community—to make our homeland and the world safer.

Though our recommendations are primarily addressed to the next President and the next Congress, we also envision an important role for citizens. We want to inform our fellow citizens, and thereby empower them to act. We call for a new emphasis on open and honest engagement between government and citizens in safeguarding our homeland and in becoming knowledgeable about and developing coordinated public responses to potential terrorist attacks.

In every terrorist strike anywhere in the world, to every innocent life lost must be added thousands more who were just hours away from having been at that ground zero, from having become innocent victims—a point powerfully underscored by the Commission's near miss on September 20, 2008. In those moments of danger, we are all, first and foremost, citizens of a world at risk, with the common cause of protecting the innocent and preserving our way of life.

It is our hope to break the all-too-familiar cycle in which disaster strikes and a commission is formed to report to us about what our government should have known and done to keep us safe. This time we do know. We know the threat we face. We know that our margin of safety is shrinking, not growing. And we know what we must do to counter the risk. There is no excuse now for allowing domestic partisanship or international rivalries to prevent or delay the actions that must be taken. We need unity at all levels—nationally, locally, and among people all across the globe. There is still time to defend ourselves, if we act with the urgency called for by the nature of the threat that confronts us. Sounding that call for urgent action is the purpose of this report.





## ***Executive Summary***

The Commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.

The Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon. The Commission believes that the U.S. government needs to move more aggressively to limit the proliferation of biological weapons and reduce the prospect of a bioterror attack.

Further compounding the nuclear threat is the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities to new states and the decision by several existing nuclear states to build up their arsenals. Such proliferation is a concern in its own right because it may increase the prospect of military crises that could lead to war and catastrophic use of these weapons. As former Senator Sam Nunn testified to our Commission: “The risk of a nuclear weapon being used today is growing, not receding.”

This Commission was chartered by Congress to assess our nation’s progress in preventing weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism—and to provide the next President and Congress with concrete, actionable recommendations that can serve as their road map to a safer homeland and world.

No mission could be timelier. The simple reality is that the risks that confront us today are evolving faster than our multilayered responses. Many thousands of dedicated people across all agencies of our government are working hard to protect this country, and their efforts have had a positive impact. But the terrorists have been active, too—and in our judgment America’s margin of safety is shrinking, not growing.

The Commission reached that sobering conclusion following six

## *Executive Summary*

months of deliberations, site visits, and interviews with more than 250 government officials and nongovernmental experts in the United States and abroad.

While the mandate of the Commission was to examine the full sweep of the challenges posed by the nexus of terrorist activity and the proliferation of all forms of WMD—chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear—we concluded early in our deliberations that this report should focus solely on the two types of WMD categories that have the greatest potential to kill in the most massive numbers: biological and nuclear weapons.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has spent billions of dollars securing nuclear weapons, materials, and technology in Russia and the former states of the Soviet Union—to good effect—and has introduced some new counterproliferation measures. But during that period, the world has also witnessed a new era of proliferation: North Korea tested a nuclear weapon; Iran has been rapidly developing capabilities that will enable it to build nuclear weapons; Dr. A. Q. Khan, of Pakistan, led a nuclear proliferation network that was a one-stop shop for aspiring nuclear weapons countries; and nuclear arms rivalries have intensified in the Middle East and Asia. If not constrained, this proliferation could prompt nuclear crises and even nuclear use at the very time that the United States and Russia are trying to reduce their nuclear weapons deployments and stockpiles.

Meanwhile, biotechnology has spread globally. At the same time that it has benefited humanity by enabling advances in medicine and in agriculture, it has also increased the availability of pathogens and technologies that can be used for sinister purposes. Many biological pathogens and nuclear materials around the globe are poorly secured—and thus vulnerable to theft by those who would put these materials to harmful use, or would sell them on the black market to potential terrorists.

According to an April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on Trends in Global Terrorism, “Activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing both in number and geographic dispersion. . . . If this trend continues, threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide.” Since 9/11 there has been an increase in the number of groups that have associated or aligned themselves with al Qaeda—the preeminent terrorist threat to the United States and the

## *Executive Summary*

perpetrators of 9/11—including al Qaeda in Iraq, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and the Algerian al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). This increase in terrorist networks is a threat to the entire world.

Though U.S. policy and strategy have made progress, they have not kept pace with the growing risks. In the area of counterterrorism, our government has innovated and implemented new initiatives since 9/11, but its focus has been mainly limited to defense, intelligence, and homeland security programs and operations. The next administration needs to go much further, using the tools of “soft power” to communicate effectively about American intentions and to build grassroots social and economic institutions that will discourage radicalism and undercut the terrorists in danger spots around the world—especially in Pakistan.

### **Biological Proliferation and Terrorism**

Since terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has addressed the risk of biological proliferation and terrorism with policies rooted in a far different mind-set than the one that guides its policies toward nuclear weapons. While U.S. strategies to combat nuclear terrorism focus on securing the world’s stocks of fissile materials before terrorists can steal or buy enough on the black market to build a nuclear bomb, the government’s approach to bioterrorism has placed too little emphasis on prevention. The Commission believes that the United States must place a greater emphasis on the prevention side of the equation.

To date, the U.S. government has invested the largest portion of its nonproliferation efforts and diplomatic capital in preventing nuclear terrorism. Only by elevating the priority of preventing bioterrorism will it be possible to substantially improve U.S. and global biosecurity.

The nuclear age began with a mushroom cloud—and, from that moment on, all those who worked in the nuclear industry in any capacity, military or civilian, understood they must work and live under a clear and undeniable security mandate. But the life sciences community has never experienced a comparable iconic event. As a result, security awareness has grown slowly, lagging behind the emergence of biological risks and threats. It is essential that the members of the life

## *Executive Summary*

sciences community—in universities, medical and veterinary schools, nongovernmental research institutes, trade associations, and biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies—foster a bottom-up effort to sensitize researchers to biosecurity issues and concerns.

**RECOMMENDATION 1:** The United States should undertake a series of mutually reinforcing domestic measures to prevent bioterrorism: (1) conduct a comprehensive review of the domestic program to secure dangerous pathogens, (2) develop a national strategy for advancing bioforensic capabilities, (3) tighten government oversight of high-containment laboratories, (4) promote a culture of security awareness in the life sciences community, and (5) enhance the nation’s capabilities for rapid response to prevent biological attacks from inflicting mass casualties.

◦ ◦ ◦

The cornerstone of international efforts to prevent biological weapons proliferation and terrorism is the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This treaty bans the development, production, and acquisition of biological and toxin weapons and the delivery systems specifically designed for their dispersal. But because biological activities, equipment, and technology can be used for good as well as harm, BW-related activities are exceedingly difficult to detect, rendering traditional verification measures ineffective. In addition, the globalization of the life sciences and technology has created new risks of misuse by states and terrorists.

The BWC has been undercut by serious violations, which went undetected for years, and by its failure to gain universal membership. Moreover, the treaty is not supported at the international level by an overarching strategy for preventing biological weapons proliferation and terrorism.

Meanwhile, U.S. biological cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programs in the former Soviet Union (FSU) have made good progress in improving pathogen security and in redirecting former bioweapons scientists to peaceful activities. In recent years, however, the Russian government has viewed such programs with disinterest and even suspicion and has argued that its growing economic strength obviates the need for continued foreign assistance. Bureaucratic and political obstacles in Rus-

## *Executive Summary*

sia have forced the United States to reluctantly cut back its biological CTR activities there. The security of pathogen collections in Russia has been improved, but the large cadre of former bioweapons scientists remains a global proliferation concern.

Although biological CTR programs have stalled in Russia, the U.S. government has expanded them elsewhere. The program now includes developing countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia that face significant risks from transnational terrorist groups, have poorly secured biological laboratories and culture collections, and experience frequent outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases. To prevent terrorists from stealing dangerous pathogens or recruiting indigenous biological experts, the United States has helped these countries upgrade laboratory security, has provided biosecurity training, and has engaged hundreds of life scientists in peaceful research projects. These efforts are ongoing, and it remains to be seen if they will be successful. Other parts of the developing world, including Africa and South America, face serious biosecurity challenges and could benefit from similar cooperative threat reduction programs.

**RECOMMENDATION 2:** The United States should undertake a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the international level to prevent biological weapons proliferation and terrorism: (1) press for an international conference of countries with major biotechnology industries to promote biosecurity, (2) conduct a global assessment of biosecurity risks, (3) strengthen global disease surveillance networks, and (4) propose a new action plan for achieving universal adherence to and effective national implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention, for adoption at the next review conference in 2011.

### **Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism**

The number of states that are armed with nuclear weapons or are seeking to develop them is increasing. Terrorist organizations are intent on acquiring nuclear weapons or the material and expertise needed to build them. Trafficking in nuclear materials and technology is a serious, relentless, and multidimensional problem.

Yet nuclear terrorism is still a preventable catastrophe. The world

## *Executive Summary*

must move with new urgency to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons nations—and the United States must increase its global leadership efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and safeguard nuclear material before it falls into the hands of terrorists. The new administration must move to revitalize the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

The nonproliferation regime embodied in the NPT has been eroded and the International Atomic Energy Agency's financial resources fall far short of its existing and expanding mandate. The amount of safeguarded nuclear bomb-making material has grown by a factor of 6 to 10 over the past 20 years, while the agency's safeguards budget has not kept pace and the number of IAEA inspections per facility has actually declined.

**RECOMMENDATION 3:** The United States should work internationally toward strengthening the nonproliferation regime, reaffirming the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons by (1) imposing a range of penalties for NPT violations and withdrawal from the NPT that shift the burden of proof to the state under review for noncompliance; (2) ensuring access to nuclear fuel, at market prices to the extent possible, for non-nuclear states that agree not to develop sensitive fuel cycle capabilities and are in full compliance with international obligations; (3) strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency, to include identifying the limitations to its safeguarding capabilities, and providing the agency with the resources and authorities needed to meet its current and expanding mandate; (4) promoting the further development and effective implementation of counterproliferation initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; (5) orchestrating consensus that there will be no new states, including Iran and North Korea, possessing uranium enrichment or plutonium-reprocessing capability; (6) working in concert with others to do everything possible to promote and maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing; (7) working toward a global agreement on the definition of “appropriate” and “effective” nuclear security and accounting systems as legally obligated under United

## *Executive Summary*

Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; and (8) discouraging, to the extent possible, the use of financial incentives in the promotion of civil nuclear power.

o o o

The United States and Russia together possess about 95 percent of the world's nuclear material. This fact has led the United States to work closely with Russia to make sure that all of this material is safe from theft and that Russia's former WMD scientists find employment outside of the nuclear military complex. The United States has spent billions of dollars securing nuclear weapons, materials, and technology in Russia and the former states of the Soviet Union. Now Russia is a full partner and the two countries must work together to help other states improve their nuclear security and safety.

Cooperative nuclear security programs, part of the overall effort by the United States to address proliferation and WMD terrorist threats, can be better utilized. To date, such cooperative programs have focused on Russia. Although there is more to do there, the next President should build on work already under way to involve all nations in the fight against proliferation and WMD terrorism.

**RECOMMENDATION 4:** The new President should undertake a comprehensive review of cooperative nuclear security programs, and should develop a global strategy that accounts for the worldwide expansion of the threat and the restructuring of our relationship with Russia from that of donor and recipient to a cooperative partnership.

o o o

The Commission focused with special urgency on the pressing nuclear proliferation designs of two nations, one with ties to terrorists and both with records of weapons proliferation: Iran and North Korea. The Commission believes strongly that the United States, together with other nations, must develop the right combination of incentives and disincentives to address these problem cases. The Commission views the nation's fundamental objectives as clear and compelling: Iran must cease all of its efforts to develop nuclear weapons; North Korea must dismantle its nuclear program. Smart diplomacy requires that any



## *Executive Summary*

approach be coupled with the credible threat of direct action to ensure we meet these objectives.

Iran continues to defy its NPT obligations, UN Security Council resolutions, and the international community in an apparent effort to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. It has 3,850 centrifuges spinning and more than 1,000 pounds of enriched uranium—three-quarters of what would be needed, after further enrichment, to build its first bomb.

Meanwhile, there has been at least some progress in the international efforts to convince North Korea to roll back its nuclear program. The February 2007 Six-Party Agreement on a concrete denuclearization plan was a first step toward the realization of a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. After months of glacial diplomatic movement, progress has recently been made on framing the verification issues. However, it remains uncertain whether Pyongyang will ultimately carry out its commitment to eliminate its nuclear weapons and associated enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Experts say that North Korea now has about 10 bombs' worth of plutonium and it has conducted a nuclear test.

The Commission decided that because of the dynamic international environment, it would not address the precise tactics that should be employed by the next administration to achieve the strategic objective of stopping the nuclear weapons programs of these two countries. Developing those tactical initiatives will clearly be one of its urgent priorities.

But on the central finding, the Commission was unanimous in concluding that the nuclear aspirations of Iran and North Korea pose immediate and urgent threats to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Successful nuclear programs in both countries could trigger a cascade of proliferation and lead to the unraveling of the NPT.

**RECOMMENDATION 5:** As a top priority, the next administration must stop the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs. In the case of Iran, this requires the permanent cessation of all of Iran's nuclear weapons-related efforts. In the case of North Korea, this requires the complete abandonment and dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. If, as appears likely, the next administration seeks to stop

## *Executive Summary*

these programs through direct diplomatic engagement with the Iranian and North Korean governments, it must do so from a position of strength, emphasizing both the benefits to them of abandoning their nuclear weapons programs and the enormous costs of failing to do so. Such engagement must be backed by the credible threat of direct action in the event that diplomacy fails.

### **Pakistan: The Intersection of Nuclear Weapons and Terrorism**

Were one to map terrorism and weapons of mass destruction today, all roads would intersect in Pakistan. It has nuclear weapons and a history of unstable governments, and parts of its territory are currently a safe haven for al Qaeda and other terrorists. Moreover, given Pakistan's tense relationship with India, its buildup of nuclear weapons is exacerbating the prospect of a dangerous nuclear arms race in South Asia that could lead to a nuclear conflict.

Pakistan is an ally, but there is a grave danger it could also be an unwitting source of a terrorist attack on the United States—possibly with weapons of mass destruction.

Our Commission has singled out Pakistan for special attention in this report, as we believe it poses a serious challenge to America's short-term and medium-term national security interests. Indeed, many government officials and outside experts believe that the next terrorist attack against the United States is likely to originate from within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. The Commission agrees. In terms of the nexus of proliferation and terrorism, Pakistan must top the list of priorities for the next President and Congress.

**RECOMMENDATION 6:** The next President and Congress should implement a comprehensive policy toward Pakistan that works with Pakistan and other countries to (1) eliminate terrorist safe havens through military, economic, and diplomatic means; (2) secure nuclear and biological materials in Pakistan; (3) counter and defeat extremist ideology; and (4) constrain a nascent nuclear arms race in Asia.

## *Executive Summary*

### **Russia and the United States**

Of all America's interests involving Russia, none is more vital than reducing the risk of the accidental or intentional use of nuclear and biological weapons against our nation and its allies from a source in Russia.

As great powers with divergent interests, the United States and Russia inevitably will have disagreements. But both governments have a responsibility to prevent these disagreements from interfering with their critical mutual interests—preventing the proliferation and use of nuclear and biological weapons and keeping WMD out of the hands of terrorists. The two countries also have a common interest in pursuing further strategic nuclear reductions.

**RECOMMENDATION 7:** The next U.S. administration should work with the Russian government on initiatives to jointly reduce the danger of the use of nuclear and biological weapons, including by (1) extending some of the essential verification and monitoring provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that are scheduled to expire in 2009; (2) advancing cooperation programs such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and the Proliferation Security Initiative; (3) sustaining security upgrades at sensitive sites in Russia and elsewhere, while finding common ground on further reductions in stockpiles of excess highly enriched uranium; (4) jointly encouraging China, Pakistan, and India to announce a moratorium on the further production of nuclear fissile materials for nuclear weapons and to reduce existing nuclear military deployments and stockpiles; and (5) offering assistance to other nations, such as Pakistan and India, in achieving nuclear confidence-building measures similar to those that the United States and the USSR followed for most of the Cold War.

### **Government Organization and Culture**

Although in 2004 the two major party presidential candidates agreed that the biggest threat to the United States was WMD terrorism, today

## *Executive Summary*

there is still no single high-level individual or office responsible for directing U.S. policy to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism. The Commission is also concerned that in numerous cases in which policy trade-offs were required, nonproliferation was viewed as a secondary security issue. It is critical to have a senior official with direct access to the President to direct and promote nonproliferation interests.

This shortcoming is compounded by the fact that the President's policymaking on WMD proliferation and terrorism is overseen by two parallel staffs—one team working for the National Security Council (NSC) and the other working for the Homeland Security Council (HSC). Senior officials must deal with time-consuming meetings and overlapping responsibilities. The greatest threat to our nation is managed across many offices, rather than by one high-level office dedicated to this single issue.

**RECOMMENDATION 8:** The President should create a more efficient and effective policy coordination structure by designating a White House principal advisor for WMD proliferation and terrorism and restructuring the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council.

o o o

While Congress has been forceful in demanding reform of the executive branch, it has been slow to heed calls from others to reform itself. Prior commissions, including the 9/11 Commission, have called for reforming congressional committee jurisdiction and oversight. Congress has made some initial progress, yet much more needs to be done.

Consistent with findings of the 9/11 Commission and other previous commissions, congressional oversight remains dysfunctional. The existing committee structure does not allow for effective oversight of crosscutting national security threats, such as WMD proliferation and terrorism.

**RECOMMENDATION 9:** Congress should reform its oversight both structurally and substantively to better address intelligence, homeland security, and crosscutting 21st-century national security missions such as the prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism.

## *Executive Summary*

◦ ◦ ◦

In response to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the intelligence community is implementing the most sweeping organizational changes since 1947. The community has achieved significant progress in a relatively short period of time and is currently engaged in a number of promising internal initiatives. Every effort should be made to accelerate those reforms. However, under the circumstances, the Commission believes that Congress and the administration should oversee and observe the results of current efforts before initiating further organizational change, though such changes might well be necessary in the future. One area should be the focus of special effort: the intelligence community still has insufficient personnel who have the critical skills needed to improve our nation's effort to stop proliferators and terrorists.

**RECOMMENDATION 10:** Accelerate integration of effort among the counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and law enforcement communities to address WMD proliferation and terrorism issues; strengthen expertise in the nuclear and biological fields; prioritize pre-service and in-service training and retention of people with critical scientific, language, and foreign area skills; and ensure that the threat posed by biological weapons remains among the highest national intelligence priorities for collection and analysis.

◦ ◦ ◦

Despite recent initiatives, the national security agencies, including the national laboratories, still lack the flexibility and workforce culture they need to attract, train, and retain individuals with the skills necessary to effectively respond to globalized, networked threats.

**RECOMMENDATION 11:** The United States must build a national security workforce for the 21st century.

◦ ◦ ◦

While the United States has had success in eliminating a number of terrorist leaders and foiling planned attacks, our government has

## *Executive Summary*

invested less effort, let alone enjoyed success, at preventing the global recruitment and ideological commitment of extremists who might seek to use nuclear or biological weapons against America or its allies. These efforts demand an approach far different from that used to capture or kill terrorists and facilitators. They require the tools of soft power, which include the ability to communicate persuasively about American intentions and to assist in promoting social and economic progress within those countries where the terrorists have a recruiting presence. Government agencies must think creatively to develop and coordinate efforts—ranging from strategic communications to targeted development assistance—to engage those who might otherwise be drawn to terrorist causes.

**RECOMMENDATION 12:** U.S. counterterrorism strategy must more effectively counter the ideology behind WMD terrorism. The United States should develop a more coherent and sustained strategy and capabilities for global ideological engagement to prevent future recruits, supporters, and facilitators.

## **The Role of the Citizen**

A well informed and mobilized citizenry has long been one of our nation's greatest resources. The next administration therefore should, within six months, work with state and local governments to develop a checklist of actions that need to be taken to improve efforts at all levels of government to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism. Citizens should hold their governments accountable for completing this checklist.

Insufficient effort has been made to engage the public in the prevention of WMD terrorism, even though public tips have provided clues necessary to disrupt terrorist plots against the homeland. We need to give our citizens guidance on what to expect from their government at all levels and on how to be engaged in the prevention of WMD terrorism.

**RECOMMENDATION 13:** The next administration must work to openly and honestly engage the American citizen,

## *Executive Summary*

encouraging a participatory approach to meeting the challenges of the new century.

o o o

We decided at the beginning of our deliberations that we would be direct and honest with the American people about the challenges we confront. That is why we have not hesitated to state our conclusion that America's margin of safety against a WMD attack is shrinking. But we also want to assure the people that there is ample and solid ground for hope about the future. Our leaders—whatever their differences over domestic issues—are united in their desire to safeguard our country. The vast majority of the world's peoples stand with us in wanting to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction and to defeat terrorists. Our nation has immense reservoirs of strength that we have only begun to use, and our enemies have weaknesses that we are learning how to exploit. There is much more that we can do to protect ourselves. In this report we lay out the steps that need to be taken, with confidence that they *will* be taken, and that as a result the United States, leading the international community, will have enhanced the safety of our world at risk.